The Deterrent Effect of the Penalties Imposed on Cartels Under Spanish Competition Law
By Sandra Marco Colino (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
This paper examines the efficacy and appropriateness of the economic penalties imposed in Spain to those companies that participate in cartels contrary to Article 1 of the Spanish Competition Law, Ley de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC). It intends to shed light on the optimal sanctions necessary to combat collusive practices in Spain.
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