ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
AT A TIME OF UPHEAVAL:
Recent Competition Policy Cases on Two Continents
Summary
The past decade has been a time of great upheaval for transatlantic competition policy. This is evident in the United States (at the federal and state levels), the European Union, and the United Kingdom. With the reinvigoration of antitrust policy has come a reinvigoration of antitrust economics, which has been increasingly prominent in the reasoning of regulators and courts. This volume chronicles key flashpoints in this process, from an economics point of view. It provides 18 contributions from leading antitrust economists involved in recent groundbreaking merger, monopolization and anticompetitive-agreement cases on both sides of the Atlantic.
Table of Contents
Editors' Bios
Authors' Bios
Introduction
I. MERGERS
1. Vertical, Horizontal, and Potential Competition: The Proposed Acquisition of Farelogix by Sabre
By Chris Doyle, Kostis Hatzitaskos, Kate Maxwell Koegel & Aviv Nevo
2. Innovation Concerns in European Merger Control: Dow/DuPont and Bayer/Monsanto
By Daniel Coublucq, David Kovo & Tommaso Valletti
3. Efficiencies, Remedies, and Competition: The Sprint/T-Mobile Merger
By John Asker & Michael L. Katz
4. Upward Pricing Pressure in Supermarket Mergers: The UK’s Asda/Sainsbury Case
By Howard Smith
5. Evaluating a Theory of Harm in a Vertical Merger: AT&T/Time Warner
By Dennis W. Carlton, Georgi V. Giozov, Mark A. Israel & Allan L. Shampine
6. Bidding Analysis and Innovation Concerns in Merger Control: General Electric/Alstom
By Daniel Coublucq & Giulio Federico
7. Mergers and Monopsony: The Anthem-Cigna Merger
By David Dranove, Dov Rothman & Samuel Weglein
8. Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: The Cedars-Sinai/Huntington Memorial Litigation
By Gregory S. Vistnes
II. MONOPOLY CONDUCT/ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
9. A Landmark Antitrust Case in Digital Markets: Google Search (Shopping)
By Andrea Amelio
10. Market Definition for Two-Sided Markets: Ohio v. American Express
By Michael L. Katz
11. Excessive Pricing as an Antitrust Harm: Three UK Cases in Generic Pharmaceuticals
By Julie Bon & Mike Walker
12. Extension of Its Search Monopoly: The EC Case against Google Android
By Cristina Caffarra & Federico Etro
13. Targeted Below-Cost Pricing in the Semiconductor Industry: The Qualcomm Predation Case
By Liliane Giardino-Karlinger
14. Advertising, Customer Data, and Competition: The German Facebook Case
By Rupprecht Podszun
15. Using and Misusing Microeconomics: Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm
By Carl Shapiro & Keith Waehrer
16. Platform Price Parity Clauses: The Hotel Booking Industry
By Thibaud Vergé
III. ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS
17. No-Poaching Agreements as Antitrust Violations: Animation Workers Antitrust Litigation
By Orley Ashenfelter & Ruth Gilgenbach
18. Can Four Traders Fix the Price of Money? The Euro-US Dollar Antitrust Litigation
By Edward A. Snyder
In all instances the basic economic features of these important cases should be accessible to all readers who have an interest in antitrust.
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Testimonials
This book is a compendium of essays on U.S. and European antitrust cases by a stellar cast of competition scholars. The focus is on the important economic issues raised by recent enforcement actions. The essays cover a wide range of frontier topics in antitrust, including vertical mergers, acquisitions that eliminate potential competitors, harm to innovation, monopsony, no-poaching agreements, and competition policy for two-sided platforms. The essays are balanced and insightful. Taken together they are essential reading for anyone interested in the current state of international antitrust enforcement.
Richard Gilbert
Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of California, BerkeleyAntitrust Economics at a Time of Upheaval is a refreshing comparative perspective on the role of economics in ways that are largely proenforcement and that consider the impact of new technologies. It is an excellent presentation of the view that antitrust need not abandon economics in order to fight anticompetitive practices effectively; to the contrary, economics provides the basic tools for supporting that fi ght. For example, effi ciencies must be proven, but they should be taken seriously. The same is true of predatory pricing. As the editors observe, new theories that either cabin or reject older Chicago-driven doctrine can be both economically rational and empirically robust.
